Males account for more than half of domesitc violence murder victims.
54.5% of murder victims in families (including children) are male. When children are murdered, 61% of the time they are murdered by their mothers. The majority of the rest of child murders are comitted by the mother's boyfriend(s).
Poison is the preferred method of murder by women. Much poisoning goes undetected and is categorized as a heart attack or stroke.
Contract killing and killing by men who are persuaded to murder men for women are categorized as multiple offender murders and are not listed as women killing men.
When women kill they usually kill their husbands, ex-husbands or boyfriends.
Sources: FBI, Uniform Crime Reports 1994, 1995, Murder in families - DOJ, July, 1994, Myth of Male Power - Warren Farrell, Ph.D.
Reported by Stuart Miller
LLR No. 9609060.CA
LLR Ed. Note: This opinion may be subject to revision before official publication.
[1] Filed 9/25/96
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
[2] COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH DISTRICT
[3] DIVISION TWO
[4] STATE OF CALIFORNIA
[5] IN RE MARRIAGE OF
[6] BRENT N. MOSS,
[7] Petitioner,
v.
[8] SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE,
[9] Respondent.
[10] TAMARA S. MOSS,
[11] Real Party in Interest.
[12] E017504
[13] (Super.Ct.No. D-108660)
Some of the language from that decision follows:
[40] Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal annulled the order, holding that a sentence of incarceration could not be imposed merely because Husband chose not to seek employment or to earn money in any way. The court relied on Ex parte Todd (1897) 119 Cal. 57, in which the Supreme Court overturned a judgment of contempt based on the contemnor's failure to seek employment, although he was admittedly without funds. The court held, in what must be considered the strongest terms, "This order was clearly in excess of the power of the court, which cannot compel a man to seek employment in order to earn money to pay alimony, and punish him for his failure to do so." (119 Cal. at p. 58.) *fn8For full text, see Moss v. Moss.[41] As the Jennings court noted, Todd was followed more recently in In re Brown (1955) 136 Cal.App.2d 40. Brown is perhaps more similar to this case than is Jennings in that in Brown there was no allegation that the contemnor had voluntarily given up employment or refused an offer; he was merely content to be supported by his new wife. This, the court held, could not support a contempt citation. *fn9
[42] The basis for these holdings, as Jennings explains, is the constitutional prohibition against involuntary servitude, as contained in the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and paralleled in Article I, section 6 of the state Constitution. The court also pointed out that the United States Supreme Court, discussing the Antipeonage Act (implementing the Thirteenth Amendment under the enabling language of the Amendment; see now 18 U.S.C.A. Section(s) 1581, 42 U.S.C.A. Section(s) 1994), [43] ". . .Congress has put it beyond debate that no indebtedness warrants a suspension of the right to be free from compulsory service. This congressional policy means that no state can make the quitting of work any component of a crime, or make criminal sanctions available for holding unwilling persons to labor." (Pollock v. Williams (1944) 322 U.S. 4, 18.) *fn10
[44] Jennings is not materially distinguishable from the case at bar and has not been overruled or criticized. *fn11 As that court observed, it is well-established that a court may take a parent (or spouse's) ability to earn into account when making a support order. (See cases collected in Marriage of Stevenson (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 71, 79.) Such an order may be enforced upon any property which the obligor acquires, for example through gift or inheritance. Theoretically, the threat of such proceedings, as well as natural self-interest, will induce or encourage most such obligors to put forth their best efforts in seeking and maintaining suitable employment. (See conc. and diss. opn. of Traynor, J., in Dimon v. Dimon (1953) 40 Cal.2d 516, 528, overruled on other grounds in Hudson v. Hudson (1959) 52 Cal.2d 35, 744-745.)
[45] Nevertheless, we would be inclined to disagree with Jennings if that decision were not based upon Supreme Court precedent, to which we must adhere. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)
[46] Although Ex Parte Todd, supra, 119 Cal.57 involved nonpayment of alimony (spousal support), we reluctantly concede that in the absence of a distinction drawn by the high court, the principles applied by the court to govern that case must be applied similarly to nonpayment of child support. However, we think that in an age in which the problem of children whose parents do not support them is placing ever-increasing burdens on society as a whole, the scope of the constitutional protections deserves re-examination. After all, an adult former spouse can be expected to take some responsibility for him or herself, but a child is the moral, as well as legal, responsibility of its parents. The level and quality of the obligation owed by a parent to a child is far different, and far greater, even than that owed by one spouse to the other, and we question whether the "involuntary servitude" of a parent obliged to work to support the child is constitutionally more offensive than the deprivations visited upon the child. We invite the Supreme Court to reconsider the holding of Ex Parte Todd, at least in the context of child support. *fn12
[47] Absent such reconsideration, we follow the law of this state and hold that petitioner cannot be compelled to work by the threat of imprisonment or other restriction on his liberty. The order of contempt is annulled.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
[48] Hollenhorst Acting P.J.
[49] We concur:
[50] McKinster J.
[51] Richli J.
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